Mr. Parthenais must have been furious! How could there even be a misunderstanding when everything seemed to clear to him?

According to Parthenais, a principal of the Canadian-based Venetian Salami Company contacted him at his business in Florida and engaged his services to investigate the collectibility of a large delinquent receivable. After performing as agreed and incurring expenses in Florida, Canada, and New York, Venetian refused to reimburse Parthenais. Sure, it was only an oral agreement, but Parthenais was certain that he remembered the terms of the deal, including Venetian’s promise to pay him in Florida.

Determined to set the record straight, Venetian’s president, Antoine Bertrand stated that Venetian never reached an agreement with Parthenais, let alone an agreement to pay him money in Florida. And while there were in fact discussions concerning the delinquent account, they all took place in New York and Montreal, not in Florida. And since Venetian did not even do business in Florida, no Florida court could exercise jurisdiction over Venetian in order to resolve the dispute.

This simple set of facts set the stage for the Florida Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Venetian Salami Company v. J.S. Parthenais, 544 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 1989).

Why did the Florida Supreme Court need to weigh in on the Venetian Salami case?

Although it had nearly been 50 years since the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the minimum contacts test in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and the Florida long-arm statute was being widely used to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents, when Venetian Salami was decided, there was a conflict among the Florida District Court’s of Appeal regarding their interplay. The 2nd DCA (in Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873 (Fla.2d DCA 1979), the 4th DCA (in Scordilis v. Drobnicki, 443 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and the 5th DCA (in Unger v. Publisher Entry Service, Inc., 513 So.2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) all held that in order for the Court to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the Court would have to separately determine both that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the scope of Florida’s long-arm statute and that sufficient minimum contacts were demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements. However, the 1st DCA, in reversing the Venetian Salami trial court’s finding the Mr. Parthenais failed to establish minimum contacts held that jurisdiction may be obtained by simply meeting the statutory requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute; in short, that the requisite minimum contacts were already built into the long-arm statute.

How did the Florida Supreme Court resolve the conflict between the DCA’s?

In short, the Court reversed the 1st DCA and upheld the analysis set forth in Osborn, Scordilis, and Unger, thus requiring Florida trial courts to make an independent determination that the long-arm statute has been properly invoked and that sufficient minimum contacts have been demonstrated before exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. From a federalism standpoint, this was an elegant result because it preserved both the federal interest ensuring due process rights and expectations of nonresidents while simultaneously allowing the Florida legislature to enact a long-arm statute which, as the Court noted, “extends only to the limits of the due process clause.” The Court’s decision was also firmly grounded in the principles which had been laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in International Shoe, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz where the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized, among other things, that a determination of minimum contacts would have to depend upon the facts of each case, not on the outcome of a mechanical test. Thus, as a practical (and legal) matter, Florida’s long-arm statute could not include an implied finding that minimum contacts are presumed or have already been established, as the trial court will always be tasked with the responsibility of sorting through the unique facts of each case and making a determination that is consistent with decisional precedent.

Why was the Court’s decision in Venetian Salami a game-changer?

First, the Court approved of the two-part analysis which was already the majority rule among the DCA’s in Florida requiring the trial court to determine: (1) whether the plaintiff’s complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the scope of Florida’s long-arm statute; and (2) whether the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements.

The Court also approved of the procedure (also outlined in previous decisions of the DCAs) to be followed in cases where a nonresident defendant contests a plaintiff’s assertion of long-arm jurisdiction under Section 48.193:

  • In addition to filing a motion to dismiss, challenging the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant must file affidavits in support of his opposition to the plaintiff’s assertion of personal jurisdiction.
  • If the defendant moves to dismiss and files affidavits in opposition, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove by affidavit the basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be obtained.

This procedure was all fine and good, as long as the affidavits could be harmonized and the court could make a decision based on facts which were essentially undisputed.  But what about cases where the relevant facts set forth in the affidavits were in direct conflict? This is where the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Venetian Salami made new law.  In such a case, the Court held that the trial court must hold a limited evidentiary hearing in order to resolve the jurisdictional issue.  This provides the trial court with an opportunity to resolve the factual disputes necessary to determine jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 and to determine whether minimum contacts exist to satisfy due process concerns.

What is the take-away of the Venetian Salami ruling?

Parties litigating over issues involving Florida personal jurisdiction have an important procedural due process right to be heard and to present evidence regarding the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.  On the one extreme, nonresident defendants who have little to no contacts with Florida have a very strong interest in not being forced to litigate and defend themselves in a Florida court; on the other, Florida residents have a very strong interest in being able to pursue nonresidents who have clearly caused damage or injury to a person or property within the state, even though the nonresident may have never even set foot in Florida or has already left the territorial boundaries of the state.  The Venetian Salami evidentiary hearing rule provides both parties with an opportunity to be heard and, assuming that both parties follow the relevant procedure, forces the court to go beyond the “four corners” of the complaint and to take other facts and factors into consideration before issuing a ruling on the personal jurisdiction issue.  These procedural due process rights even extend to allowing a party, with the Court’s permission, to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery in order to prepare for and advance their arguments at the evidentiary hearing.  Gleneagle Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Leondakos, 602 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1992).  And finally, a trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the jurisdictional dispute has been held to constitute reversible error. Greenspire Glob., Inc. v. Sarasota Green Grp. (Fla. App. 2020).